Mr. Justice Black and the Supreme Court by Barnett, Vincent M., Jr.
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TECAUSE of the circumstances surrounding his accession to the
Sbench, the career of Hugo Lafayette Black as Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States has been of more than
usual public interest. Much of that interest has centered around criti-
cisms which are unworthy of their subject. It must be said at the outset
that this article is not primarily an attempt to defend Justice Black's
ability; in the three years that he has been a member of the Court he has
demonstrated that he is fully qualified to perform his duties, and today
his record on constitutional issues is already of considerable significance.
Mr. Justice Black's appointment to the bench marked the beginning of
an important change in the Court's attitude as to what the Constitution
requires of the federal judiciary; a change involving greater judicial re-
straint in dealing with legislation and also a restriction in the scope of the
jurisdiction of the federal judiciary in dealing with the concerns of the
several states. At first this change was only a surgence, expressed in
Black's dissenting opinions; but with the appointment of Justices Reed,
Frankfurter, Douglas, and Murphy, the change began to find expres-
sion in majority opinions.' Justice Black's role during this period has been
a major one, and a study of his opinions aids materially in gaining an
insight into the political and social theory behind the change-a change
which in many ways is a resurgence of the constitutional views of Jefferson
and Madison.
Unfavorable publicity attending President Roosevelt's choice of Sen-
ator Black for the Supreme Court, together with the number of dissenting
opinions rendered by the new Justice during his first term on the bench,
inspired various attacks questioning the wisdom of the appointment. To
the extent that these attacks were upon Black's intellectual capacity to
serve as a judge, they require no detailed consideration here. It has been
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said that Black's admittedly able constitutional opinions must have been
ghost-written by some good lawyer.2 This and similar charges have been
discussed and disposed of by other observers.' It has also been said that
New Dealer Black, on the bench, has fashioned his constitutional views
to suit the exigencies of the course of New Deal politics. 4 Mr. Justice
Black's record as United States Senator indicates, however, that the
views he expresses in his opinions are not built upon mere ephemeral politi-
cal considerations, but are the expression of a deep-rooted constitutional
philosophy. Whether the judgment of a justice of the Supreme Court
should be based upon a constitutional philosophy differing in any great
degree from that of his immediate predecessors is, however, a different
question; and while it is true that this charge of lack of "judicial tempera-
ment" is usually made by those whose real disagreement is with the con-
stitutional philosophy itself, the charge nevertheless has some foundation
in respected theories as to the nature of the judicial function. The charge
can best be discussed after a consideration of the cases.
Before turning to the opinions of Justice Black, however, it will be
useful to survey the record of Senator Black; for that record expresses
the man's views perhaps even more clearly than the judicial opinions.
His basic principles-a Jacksonian distrust of entrenched privilege and
corporate greed, a firm belief in the prerogatives of legislatures as the
representative organs in a democracy, and an aversion to judicial en-
croachment upon the spheres of administrative and legislative action-
these principles were clearly set forth during his terms in the Senate. His
views on constitutional power have always been influenced by the con-
viction that the Constitution must and does provide authority for effec-
tive and progressive government. As early as 193o his opposition to utility
exploitation of the consumer and his belief in vigorous and effective public
regulation were matters of public knowledge.$ As the moving figure in
z Referring to Black's dissenting opinion in McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 3o2 U.S.
419 (1937), discussed infra p. 33, Newsweek reported: "Lawyers agreed that the dissent was
ably written ..... To many who questioned Black's legal knowledge, this opinion had the ear-
marks of ghost-writing. A rumor got around and even into print that it was the work of Tom
Corcoran, ace New Deal lawyer, expert on utilities, and close friend of the new justice."
zi Newsweek, No. 21, at 26 (May 23, 1938). See also Lerner, Justice Black Dissenting, 146
Nation 264 (March 5, 1938).
3 See, e.g., Hamilton, Mr. Justice Black's First Year, 95 New Republic u8 (June 8, 1938);
Curtis, How about Hugo Black?, 163 Atlantic Monthly 667 (May, 1939); Lerner, Hugo
Black: A Personal History, 145 Nation 367 (October 8, 1937); Lerner, Justice Black Dissent-
ing, 146 Nation 264 (March 5, 1938.)
4 See, e.g., Childs, The Supreme Court Today, 176 Harpers 581 (May, 1938).
s 72 Cong. Rec. 1489 (1930).
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the well-remembered Senatorial investigation into lobbying by public utili-
ties he later identified himself more completely with these views.6 And as
early as 193o he attacked the unfair profits and "undesirable concentra-
tion of wealth" in these utilities, remarking that "plunder of the many
seems to have become the privilege of the few. ' 7 Furthermore, it was his
view that the Fourteenth Amendment was not intended to impose a re-
striction upon the power of states to regulate the activities of public utility
and other corporations. In a Senate speech in 1935 on an anti-lynching
measure he had occasion to refer to his study of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. "I found," he remarked, "that although the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was intended to protect members of the colored race, it had served
to protect not them, except in a very few instances, but it had served to
protect corporate greed and cupidity. It had served, as we all know, to
paralyze the arms of the States of the Union in their efforts to protect the
people from corporate cupidity."'
His insistence upon broad powers for the states, however, was coupled
with a belief in a strong national government, in those fields where Con-
gress chose to act. He early indicated his adherence to a broad interpreta-
tion of the commerce clause, saying that Congress' power to regulate inter-
state commerce is "supreme, as it would be in any single state." 9 One of
the main obstacles in the way of governments' attempts to meet changed
conditions, he felt, was the usurpation of legislative power by judges.
His notion that representative government requires a great deal of re-
straint on the part of courts in dealing with the activities of state and
national legislative and administrative bodies found constant expression
in his senatorial utterances. The Constitution should not be "so misinter-
preted and altered as to shackle the democratic processes themselves,"',,
for it was such "judicial tinkering with the Constitution" which "took
from the people of my state and of every other state the right of their
legislative representatives to regulate public utility rates except on condi-
tion that the state shall be brought all the way to the Supreme Court in
Washington for that Court to pass on a reasonable profit."" This process,
he felt, "amounted to a clear usurpation of legislative power by the judges,
changed the basic theory of our Constitution .... protected wealth at
6 See Black, Inside a Senate Investigation, 172 Harpers 275 (February, 1936).
7 72 Cong. Rec. 4469-7o (1930). 8 79 Cong. Rec. 6359 (E935).
9 This statement was made during the argument on the regulation of the petroleum indus-
try, January, 1935. 79 Cong. Rec. 757-58 (i935).
lo 81 Cong. Rec. App. 307 (1937).
xx Ibid. This was a radio address of February 23, 1937, read into the record.
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the expense of poverty .... stripped the states of their powers and trans-
ferred these powers to the dominant five or six judges."- It was a process
which was "gradually and sometimes silently (as Jefferson said) absorbing
to the federal judiciary, the only governmental department not respon-
sible to the people, all the legislative rights of States and Federal Govern-
ment." 3 Republican government was not strengthened, he felt, by such
assumption of power by courts.
INTEGRATION OF STATE AD NATIONAL POWERS
Some of Black's most significant comments as a Supreme Court justice
have been made upon the problem of the integration of state and national
powers in a federal system. He has emphasized his belief in a kind of
federalism which would grant a wide field of action to the states when
the national government has not acted, but one which would also give
Congress broad powers where it chooses to act. Thus, Black has at-
tempted to free state legislatures from many of the restrictions of the
Fourteenth Amendment as heretofore interpreted and from the implied
limitations of the commerce clause. At the same time, however, this in-
crease in state power does not mean a corresponding decrease in national
power. The national power, when exercised, Black is willing to uphold in
its broadest terms. Conflicting state legislation is, of course, void.' 4 An
examination of his opinions on state legislation, on the extent of com-
merce clause powers, and the scope of the jurisdiction of the federal
courts, will help to clarify this position.
In the twenty-nine cases involving state tax laws coming before the
Court during his three years on the bench, Black has voted only once to
invalidate a statute. In this instance, moreover, only a partial invalida-
tion was required and a relatively unimportant issue was involved."5 In
most of the cases concerning the Fourteenth Amendment and the taxing
power of the states, the Court ruled to uphold the tax in question. In
such instances Black merely went along with the majority. 6 In a few
12 81 Cong. Rec. App. 3o6 (1937). 1 8i Cong. Rec. App. 307 (1937).
14 See, e.g., Black's remark in Gwin Co. v. Henneford upholding the "sound position that
state laws are not invalid under the commerce clause unless they actually discriminate against
interstate commerce or conflict with a regulation enacted by Congress." 3o5 U.S. 434, 446
(1939). The intimation is clear that in the event of such conflict, the law would be invalid.
'5 Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 3o4 U.S. 518 (1938), concerned a California tax on
liquor sales made in Yosemite National Park, and a state license fee to sell or import liquor
into the park. The former was held valid, the latter invalid, in a unanimous opinion written by
Justice Reed.
16 Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (i937); Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S.
5o6 (1937); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 3o5 U.S. ig (i938); Welch v. Henry, 3o5 U.S. 134
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cases he indicated some divergence from the views of the majority by
concurring separately without opinion, but he did not express himself in a
written opinion so long as the laws in question were ruled valid.'1 In a
number of dissenting opinions Black has differed from the majority of
the Court as to the extent to which the commerce clause is an implied
restriction upon the state taxing power. His practical experience with
legislative problems had led him to believe that courts are unable-except
within certain broad limits-to set up satisfactory criteria in these cases;
consequently, he insisted that the problem was for Congress to enact
legislation aimed at integrating competing tax systems, and that until
Congress had done so the Supreme Court should permit the states a broad
degree of freedom. In Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen'8 an Indiana gross in-
come tax as applied to income derived from sales in other states was ruled
unconstitutional, as constituting a burden on interstate commerce. In a
long dissenting opinion Black pointed out that the tax was general in
effect, that it did not discriminate against interstate commerce, and that
it fell uniformly on all gross incomes. Nor did it contravene any law of
Congress. He deplored the striking down of the statute because of "merely
possible future unfair burdens," and concluded:
Until Congress, in the exercise of its plenary power over interstate commerce, fixes
a different policy, it would appear desirable that the States should remain free to
adopt tax systems imposing uniform and non-discriminatory taxes upon interstate
and intrastate business alike.19
Again in Gwin Co. v. Henneford2o Black dissented from a majority opinion
holding invalid a Washington tax on gross receipts from the business of
marketing fruit shipped in interstate and foreign commerce. He asserted
that the statute imposed a general, non-discriminatory tax measured by
gross receipts upon all business operating in the state. He agreed with
the majority as to the possible dangers in waiting for Congress to act,
but he thought that the national legislature was the agency responsible
for remedying them when they arose.
It is essential today, as at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that com-
merce among the states and with foreign nations be left free from discriminatory and
(1938); Felt & Tarrant Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62 (1939); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Gallagher, 3o6 U.S. 182 (1939); Curry v. McCandless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Graves v. Elliott,
307 U.S. 383 (i939); Pearson v. McGraw, 3o8 U.S. 3r3 (1939); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp,
308 U.S. 33i (i939); Madden v. Kentucky, 3o9 U.S. 83 (r94o); Illinois Central R. Co. v.
Minnesota, 3o9 U.S. 157 (1940).
27 Dixie Ohio Express Co. v. State Revenue Com'n, 306 U.S. 72 (1939); Southern Pacific Co.
v. Gallagher, 3o6 U.S. 167 (1939).
X8 304 U.S. 307 (938). Xs Ibid., at 327. 20,305 U.S. 434 (1939).
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retaliatory burdens imposed by the States. It is of equal importance, however, that
the judicial department of our government scrupulously observe its constitutional
limitations and that Congress should adopt a broad national policy of regulation-if
otherwise valid state laws combine to hamper the free flow of commerce.2 X
The most recent expression of these views is in the dissenting opinion in
McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines,22 in which-it is important to note-
Black was joined by Justices Frankfurter and Douglas. This case con-
cerned an Arkansas tax imposed on each gallon of gasoline, above twenty,
brought into the state by motor vehicles for use as fuel in such vehicles.
The proceeds of the tax were allocated for use in highway maintenance.
In the particular case the tax was applied to gasoline carried by inter-
state motor busses for use as fuel in the course of an interstate journey.
The majority ruled the tax unconstitutional, refusing to accept the con-
tention that it was a tax on the privilege of using the highways. The three
dissenters thought it could reasonably be considered such a tax, since it
reached busses and trucks, which caused the heaviest wear on the roads.
They were of the opinion, however, that such considerations should be
for the legislative branch-the Court "has but a limited responsibility in
that state legislation may here be challenged if it discriminates against
interstate commerce or is hostile to the congressional grant of authority." 23
Federal action is necessary to bring about appropriate uniformity in the
regulation of interstate commerce. But courts are not equipped to do the
task. The problem is for Congress.
Unconfined by "the narrow scope of judicial proceedings" Congress alone can, in
the exercise of its plenary constitutional control over interstate commerce, not only
consider whether such a tax .... is consistent with the best interests of our national
economy, but can also on the basis of full exploration of the many aspects of a compli-
cated problem devise a national policy fair alike to the States and our Union. Diverse
and interacting state laws may well have created avoidable hardships ..... But the
remedy, if any is called for, we think is within the ample reach of Congress.24
21 Ibid., at 455.
22309 U.S. 176 (1940). 23 Ibid., at 184.
24 Ibid., at 189. Black voted with the majority in the remaining tax cases, in all of which
(except Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 (1938)) the exercise of state power
was upheld. See note 16 supra for cases involving the Fourteenth Amendment. State tax laws
challenged under the federal commerce power were upheld in: Western Livestock v. Bureau of
Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); Coverdale v. Pipe Line Co., 3o3 U.S. 604 (1938); Bacon &
Sons v. Martin, 3o5 U.S. 38o (x939); Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. State Tax Com'n, 302
U.S. 90 (1937); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Co., 309 U.S. 33 (i94o); McGoldrick v. Felt &
Tarrant Co., 309 U.S. 70 (i94o); McGoldrick v. Compagnie G~nurale Transatlantique, 3o9
U.S. 430 (194o). A Hawaii tax, challenged under the commerce clause and the Fifth Amend-
ment, was upheld in Inter-Island Steam Navagation Co. v. Hawaii, 305 U.S. 3o6 (1938), with
Black writing the majority opinion.
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Thus, while Black's position on state power seems Jeffersonian, and his
insistence upon Congress' "plenary constitutional control over interstate
commerce" may seem Hamiltonian, this paradox may be explained by
the Justice's understanding that problems of commerce (i.e., economic
life) are indeed national and that the Constitution provides the Congress
with power to deal with them.
Not only does Black seek to point out the limits of the commerce clause
restrictions on state activity, but he has also developed very clear views
on the application and scope of the Fourteenth Amendment as a restric-
tion on state regulations of corporate activities.25 Black's disagreement
with the majority on this point has been on two levels. First, he does not
believe that the Fourteenth Amendment should apply to corporations at
all; and in this view he continues to stand alone. Second, he believes that
even if the Fourteenth Amendment is to be used to protect corporations,
it should not furnish a basis for such extensive judicial review as has here-
tofore obtained. In Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. JohnsoW5 Black
sets forth his view that the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to
corporations. In that case the Court invalidated a California corporate
franchise tax, levied on the privilege of doing business in the state and
measured by gross premiums, as applied to an insurance company effect-
ing reinsurance outside the state. Dissenting, Black thought that the cor-
porate franchise tax had not been proved "beyond all reasonable doubt"
to violate the Federal Constitution-i.e., that the majority of the Court
was carrying the process of judicial review too far-and that the state
supreme court should therefore be sustained. He went beyond this, how-
ever, and took occasion to strike directly at one of the commonly ac-
cepted postulates regarding the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. He denied that the word "person" in that amendment in-
cluded corporations within the sphere of its operation. "Neither the his-
tory nor the language" of the provision, he said, justifies the inclusion of
corporations within its protection2 7 Historically, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment "followed the freedom of a race from slavery." Taking the language
of the amendment, he showed how the word "person" as used in other
2S The contract clause has become a less important restriction on state activity in recent
years. Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution (1938). In Indiana ex rel. Anderson
v. Brand, 3o3 U.S. 95 (1938), Black wrote a unanimous opinion holding that Indiana legisla-
tion affecting teachers' tenure was not invalid under the contract clause.
2'303 U.S. 77 (1939).
27 Ibid., at 85-86. For a discussion as to whether the history of the provision justifies ap-
plication of the amendment to corporations, see McLaughlin, The Court, the Corporation,
and Conkling, 46 Am. Hist. Rev. 45 (October, 194o).
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phrases of the same article could not mean "corporation. ' ' 2S Yet in the
first fifty years after its adoption, in only one-half of one per cent of the
cases was the amendment invoked for the protection of Negroes, while
in more than fifty per cent it was extended to corporations. "If the people
of this nation," concluded Black,
wish to deprive the states of their sovereign rights to determine what is a fair and just
tax upon corporations doing a purely local business within their own state boundaries,
there is a way provided by the Constitution to accomplish this purpose. That way does
not lie along the course of judicial amendment to that fundamental charter. An
Amendment having that purpose could be submitted by Congress as provided by the
Constitution. I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment had that purpose,
nor that it should be construed as having that purpose. 9
As in state tax legislation cases, so in state police power cases Black
has sought generally to uphold the power of the state to legislate with
regard to its local industries. In a suit to enjoin the enforcement of a
Florida statute providing for the marking and labeling of canned citrus
fruit products, the federal district court dismissed the bill upon motion
to dismiss, and consequently without hearing the evidence. The Supreme
Court, in a short per curiam opinion, 3° reversed the decree and remanded
the case for trial, stating that the allegations in the plaintiff's bill were
sufficient to call the constitutionality of the statute into question under
the Fourteenth Amendment and that the district court should have heard
the evidence. For Black the presumption in favor of the constitutionality
of state legislation was so strong,3' and the general economic background
of the particular legislation-a matter of such common knowledge that
the Court might take judicial notice of it-so persuasive, as to render
the possibility of the plaintiff's adducing evidence to show unconstitu-
tionality so remote that there was no justification for the delay caused
by sending the suit back for trial.
This presumpticn in favor of state legislation-to be noted particularly
in matters relating to taxation and the regulation of economic affairs-
does not extend, however, to legislation which is challenged as restricting
civil liberties.32 It is significant that of the eleven instances in which Black
28Section x refers to "all persons born or naturalized." Section 2 declares that representa-
tives shall be apportioned according to the whole number of "persons" in each state, excluding
Indians not taxed. Section 3 provides that no "person" who engaged in insurrection could be a
Senator or Representative. Could corporations, Black asked, have been meant by the word
"person" in any of these provisions?
29 Connecticut Gen'l Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 90 (1938).
30 Polk Co. v. Glover, 305 U.S. 5 (1938).
3' Ibid., at 16. See also Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940).
32 Cf. Schneider v. State, 3o8 U.S. 147, i55, 162, 163 (i939).
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has voted to invalidate state laws, nine were cases voiding statutes in-
volving restrictions on civil liberties. Two of these concerned anti-picket-
ing ordinances, 33 and three others concerned licensing of circular and
handbill distribution. 34 True, his record on civil liberties is little different
from that of other members of the Court, but in view of his hesitancy
to invalidate other kinds of state legislation under the Constitution, it is
of added significance that he should do so here. There is nothing in Black's
record to deny that the Fourteenth Amendment, in this respect at least,
is an important limitation on state action. And it is interesting to note,
in view of some of the less responsible charges which have been made
against Black, that his record on cases involving Negroes will bear the
most severe scrutiny. He has been with the majority in several cases
protecting Negroes from the unequal operation of state laws and judicial
procedure.35 And in Chambers v. Florida3 6 he wrote the opinion of the
Court reversing the convictions of murder obtained against four Negroes
on the basis of confessions secured by five days of questioning and coer-
cion. The methods revealed by the record, he said, were unnecessarily
harsh.
Today, as in ages past, we are not without tragic proof that the exalted power of
some governments to punish manufactured crime dictatorially is the handmaid of
tyranny. Under our constitutional system, the courts stand against any winds that
blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are help-
less, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and
public excitement.37
33 Thornhill v. Alabama, 3vo U.S. 88 (194o), and Carlson v. California, 3io U.S. io6 (1940).
The only two instances in which Black voted to invalidate state action, aside from civil
liberties cases, were Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 3o4 U.S. 518 (1938), and Hale v.
Bimco Trading Co., 3o6 U.S. 375 (1939). In the latter case he voted with the Court in an
opinion written by Justice Frankfurter, ruling that a Florida statute requiring the inspection
of imported cement, imposed too high a fee and constituted an unlawful discrimination against
interstate commerce.
s4 Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); and Schneider
v. State, 3o8 U.S. 147 (1939). See also Cantwel v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). But cf.
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 3io U.S. 586 (i94o), where a flag-salute law was upheld
in the face of a claim for protection of freedom of conscience and religion under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Black voted with the majority.
3S Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613 (1938); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337
(1938); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (x939). These cases involved, respectively, the exclusion
of Negroes from the jury list, the failure to provide a legal education for Negroes in the institu-
tions of the state, and a discriminatory election registration law. Black himself wrote the
majority opinion in Pierre v. Louisiana, 3o6 U.S. 354 (1939), holding that the exclusion of
Negroes from the grand jury was a denial of a constitutional right.
36309 U.S. 227 (1940). See also White V. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (i94o), in which Black's
majority opinion is based on the Chambers case.
37 Ibid., at 241.
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It is true that the views entertained by Justice Black with regard to
the application and scope of the Fourteenth Amendment in cases involv-
ing corporations and with regard to an implied limitation in the commerce
clause on the taxing powers of the states have not found acceptance in
the majority opinions of the Court. However, the shift in attitude by the
Supreme Court with regard to intergovernmental tax immunity is an
important instance of the acceptance by the majority of the views first
expressed in concurring opinions by Black. Soon after he had commenced
his duties, the Court rendered an important decision in two cases argued
and decided together. 35 It was held that a state tax on the gross receipts
of a contractor, derived from a contract with the United States, did not
constitute a burden on a federal instrumentality and was a valid exercise
of the state taxing power. This was a five-to-four decision. justices Rob-
erts, McReynolds, Sutherland and Butler, dissenting,39 felt that strict ap-
plication of the old doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity required
the voiding of such a state tax. Chief justice Hughes wrote the majority
opinion in this case. Black voted with the majority, without, as yet, ex-
pressing any individual views on the matter.40 Shortly afterward, the
Court in two cases upheld the application of the federal income tax to
persons claiming immunity by reason of connection with state govern-
ments. In Helvering v. TIerrell4 the application of the income tax to
persons hired in the liquidation of a corporation by state officers was
upheld by a unanimous court. In Helvering v. Mountain Producers Co.42
the application of the federal income tax to a lessee of state school lands
was ruled valid. Chief justice Hughes wrote the opinion, with justices
McReynolds and Butier dissenting. In both these cases Black voted with
the majority without undertaking to express his views.
When the important case of Helvering v. Gerhardt43 arose, however,
Black no longer contented himself with silent acquiescence. In this in-
stance he again agreed with the decision of the majority, but for the first
time took occasion to attack the time-worn formula that while "non-
39 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), and Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Com'n,
302 U.S. 186 (i937).
39 302 U.S. 134, 16i (1937).
40 The following year, in Atkinson v. Tax Com'n, 303 U.S. 20 (1938), the Court ruled in a
per curiam opinion that the Oregon income tax on persons working on the Bonneville Dam,
being built by contract with the United States, constituted no burden on a federal instru-
mentality. In Helvering v. Bankline Oil Co., 303 U.S. 362 (1938), a federal tax on the profits
of a lessee of state oil lands was upheld as not interfering with a state instrumentality. Black
was silently with the Court in both these cases.
4x 303 U.S. 218 (z93&). 4 303 U.S. 376 (1938). 43 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
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essential" government activities could be taxed by the other government,
"essential" functions could not be so taxed. The case involved a federal
tax on the salary of employees of the Port of New York Authority. Justice
Stone, writing the majority opinion, upheld the application of the tax on
the basis of the usual formula, finding that such a tax did not impede
any "essential" state function. Black, while concurring44 in the result
that the tax was valid, went beyond the majority opinion and urged that
the Court should now reconsider Collector v. Day,45 the leading precedent
for intergovernmental tax immunity. The Constitution, he asserted, gave
no implied immunity to either state or federal government from taxation
by the other. Any judicial attempt to impose such immunity-except
within'the broad limits set by the discrimination test-was therefore not
only without constitutional foundation, but clumsy in practice. Discus-
sing the usual "essential governmental function" formula, Black re-
marked:
Conceptions of "essential governmental functions" vary with individual phil-
osophies ..... The genius of our government provides that within the sphere of con-
stitutional action, the people--acting not through the courts but through their elected
legislative representatives-have the power to determine as conditions demand what
services and functions the public welfare requires.46
At the same term a federal admission tax as applied to the football games
of a state university was upheld in a majority opinion written by Justice
Roberts, who applied the old formula.47 Black again indicated a concur-
rence with the result only. Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented.
This gradual shift in attitude, noticeable first in a loose application of
the old "essential function" criterion,4 and later in the separate concur-
rences of Justice Black, reached its climax in Graves v. New York ex rel.
O'Keefe.49 Here Justice Stone not only wrote the majority opinion up-
holding 'a state income tax on a federal employee, but adopted the sugges-
tion made by Black a scant year earlier ° to overrule the sixty-eight-year-
old precedent of Collector v. Day. Hence, in a short space of time the
view of Black, expressed first in a separate concurring opinion, had be-
come essentially the view of the majority. As a fitting epilogue to this
44 Ibid., at 424. 45 II Wall. (U.S.) 113 (1871).
46 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 426-27 (1938).
47 Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
48 The dissents of Justices Roberts, McReynolds, Butler, and Sutherland in James v. Dravo
Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937), and of Justices McReynolds and Butler in Helvering v.
Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), and Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405
(1938), point out the departure from the former applications of the criterion.
49 3o6 U.S. 466 (r939), noted in 6 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 705 (I939).
so Note 44 supra.
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line of decisions, Black himself wrote the majority opinion in a case
shortly thereafter,s ruling, on the basis of the O'Keefe case, that a Utah
state income tax on the salaries of Reconstruction Finance Corporation
attorneys was constitutional. Thus was accomplished, during Black's first
two years on the Supreme Court, a sweeping change in what had seemed
to many to be fundamental constitutional doctrine.
The intergovernmental tax immunity cases thus far discussed have
dealt only with an implied immunity, heretofore said to exist and to be
judicially enforceable because of the nature of the federal system itself.
To deny that an implied immunity exists is not to deny that Congress may
specifically provide for the tax immunity of one of its agencies. Thus,
Black voted with the majority in Pittman v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 2
where the Court held that a state tax on mortgage recording was invalid
as applied to the HOLC, since Congress had expressly provided that the
agency should be immune from taxation.
Limitation upon the extent to which the Supreme Court may give
effect to an implied prohibition under the commerce clause; reluctance
to apply the Fourteenth Amendment to state laws regulating corpora-
tions; impatience with procedural technicalities where the enforcement
of state regulatory measures is at stake; refusal to find judicial power to
enforce an implied constitutional immunity in intergovernmental tax
cases-all are manifestations of a constitutional philosophy which would
draw dearer lines between state and national affairs and limit the power
of the federal courts to blur those lines. And it is perhaps not entirely
coincidence that it was during the early part of justice Black's term that
the Court, in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 3 took occasion to strike a more
direct blow at the power of the federal courts by overruling Swift v.
Tyson.5 4 While it may be agreed that justice Black's influence was of
minor importance in the Erie case (as compared with that of Justice
Brandeis), it is nevertheless significant that Black has expressed a sym-
pathy with the doctrine surpassing even that of his brethren.
Even before the Erie case, Black had given some indication of his posi-
tion. In a suit on a life insurance policy, the majority of the Court upheld
the lower federal court in applying the federal common law rule as to the
effect of a presumption. 5  Black, dissenting, thought that the state rule
should have been applied.56 In part, his opinion was based upon an objec-
5' State Tax Com'n v. Van Cott, 3o6 U.S. 5i (1939). See also Buckstaff Co. v. McKinley,
3o8 U.S. 358 (194o).
s2 3o8 U.S. 21 (1939).
3 304 U.S. 64 (1938). ss New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 161 (1938).
S4 z6 Pet. (U.S.) X (1842). s6 Ibid., at 172.
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tion to the federal rule itself because of its operation in giving a "jury
function" to the judge; but his view is also based upon the notion that the
state rule should in any event be controlling. Significantly Black failed
to mention the existence of a state statute (set out in brief of counsel)57
which might arguably have permitted the application of state law within
the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson; a fact which may perhaps be taken to
indicate that he did not care to limit the effect of his remarks to the par-
ticular case before him.
Since the Erie case, Black has manifested a disposition to give the doc-
trine a more rigorous application than that given by the majority. In a
suit by the United States as guardian of an Indian, for interest on taxes
erroneously collected by a Kansas county, the majority held that interest
should be denied, but refused to apply the Kansas law.:5 Black, concur-
ring in the denial of interest, objected to the majority's reasoning, stating
that he concurred "because the laws of Kansas deny interest on tax
refunds ..... "59
Finally, it was justice Black who wrote the opinion in a recent case °
which apparently gives a considerable extension to the doctrine of Erie v.
Tompkins. In a bankruptcy litigation in a federal court, a dispute arose
regarding the title to certain land held by the bankrupt estate. Under
the Erie case, state law would supposedly have been applied by the federal
court; but because there was no settled state law on the question in dis-
pute, justice Black held for a unanimous court that the local nature of the
matter required that it actually be sent to the state courts for decision.
Thus was effected an even more complete separation between state and
national affairs than was envisaged in the Erie case.6'
RELATION BETWEEN COURTS AND OTHER AGENCIES
OF GOVERNMENT
The cases discussed above demonstrate justice Black's belief that a
federal system functions best when there is a clear separation between
state and national activities; that as an aid to this separation of activities,
federal courts must exercise restraint in dealing with the activities of state
57 Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson, I935) § io6oo, cited in Brief of Respondent, at 69,
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. x6z (1938).
5SBoard of County Com'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343 (1939). Cf. Pullman Co. v.
Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 542, 547-48 (i939).
s9 308 U.S. 343, 353, 355 (x939).
6o Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478 (194o), noted in 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
727 (1940).
6, See 7 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 727 (1940).
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legislatures. Justice Black's insistence upon narrowing the operation of
federal court review does not arise alone, however, from his desire for a
clear separation between state and national activities. It arises also from
his belief that since it is the legislative and administrative bodies who are
responsible to the people in a representative government, the preservation
of the representative nature of the government requires that the courts,
simply because they are courts rather than legislative or administrative
bodies, limit the scope of their review of state administrative matters,
national administrative activity, and national legislation.
In the sphere of public utility regulation by state administrative bodies,
Black's objections to the prevailing scope of judicial review are closely
analogous to his views in dealing with the validity of state statutes. Admit-
ting, of course, that administrative regulations are subject to review under
traditional concepts of procedural due process, he denies that the Four-
teenth Amendment furnishes authority for the federal courts to indulge
in judicial rate-making under notions of substantive due process. Even
where Black has admitted the power to review, he has disagreed with the
scope of the review granted. For the majority the case of McCart v. In-
dianapolis Water Co.6 2 could be decided temporarily by a short per curiam
opinion sending the case back to the district court for retrial on the ques-
tion of confiscation in view of the change in economic conditions which
had occurred between the time of the taking of evidence and the rendering
of the decree. For Black the litigation provided the opportunity to set
down, in one of his first written opinions on the Court, his views with re-
gard to the function of the federal courts in dealing with the intrastate
utility problem and the general problem of valuation and rate-making.63
In the first place, in the absence of any allegation by the company of lack
of procedural due process in its dealings with the state commission, Black
objected to any review by the federal courts. Noting that the Indianapolis
Water Co. was a single company located within a single state, he re-
marked, "I believe that the State of Indiana has the right to regulate
the price of water in Indianapolis free from interference by federal
courts." 64
For the first hundred years of this Nation's history federal courts did not interfere
with state legislation fixing maximum rates for public services performed within the
respective states. The state legislatures, according to a custom which the Court
declared had existed "from time immemorial" decided what those maximum rates
should be. This Court also said that "for protection against abuses by legislatures the
people must resort to the polls, not to the courts." It was not until i8go that a divided
court finally repudiated its earlier constitutional interpretation and declared that due
62 302 U.S. 419 (1937). 63Ibid., at 423. 64 Ibid., at 44.
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process of law requires judicial invalidation of legislative rates which the courts believe
confiscatory. The dissenting justices adhered to the long existing principle that regula-
tion of public utilities was a "legislative prerogative and not a judicial one."'6 s
In the second place, even assuming that review was proper, Black objected
to the procedure employed by the majority. The litigation had begun in
1931; in 1937 it was to be returned for consideration "anew." In view of
the "almost insuperable obstacles to rate regulation," 66 he warned that the
case would keep shuttling back and forth until the Supreme Court handed
down a definitive decision; that the only function of the Court was to
decide the issue of confiscation, and that there was ample material in the
record to indicate that there was no confiscation.
In United Gas Co. v. Texa 67 he again disagreed with the reasoning of
the Court in a utility rate case. The Court ruled that a rate fixed by the
Texas Railroad Commission was no violation of due process. Black, con-
curring, took occasion to stress his view that the function of the Court is
limited to a review of the procedural due process.68 Applying this view
to the particular case, he quoted an 1877 opinion to the effect that
it is not possible to hold that a party has, without due process of law, been deprived
of his property, when, as regards the issues affecting it, he has, by the laws of the State,
a fair trial in a court of justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable to
such a case.6 9
Not only, therefore, has Black declined to find any of the rate orders
before the Court confiscatory, but he has gone on record as favoring a
reinterpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment narrowing the scope of
review of the federal judiciary over the actions of state administrative
agencies.
In the sphere of federal administrative action, Black's record is con-
sistent with his general attitude of respect for the practical problems
facing legislative and administrative bodies. In the twenty-six cases be-
fore the Court involving federal administrative action, during the three
years the majority has on five occasions reversed an administrative rul-
ing.7o In every one of these five cases Black dissented. In one case he
6s Ibid., at 427-28. 67 303 U.S. 123 (1938)-
66 Ibid., at 435. 68 Ibid., at 146.
69 Ibid., at 153, quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 105 (1877). Cf. Driscoll v.
Edison Light & Power Co., 307 U.S. io4 (I939), where the majority upheld a Pennsylvania
temporary rate statute, on the ground that the state commission, in applying the statute, had
used the "rule of Smyth v. Ames." Justices Frankfurter and Black, concurring, stated that the
procedure as set forth in the statute was adequate.
70 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. i (1938); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 3o5
U.S. 197 (1938); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 3o6 U.S. 292 (1939);
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dissented without opinion,71 in two others he concurred in a dissenting
opinion written by Justice Reed72 and in still another he and Reed dis-
sented without specific opinions. 73 It is in his own dissenting opinion in
NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co.74 that one finds the first
expression of Black's opinions with regard to the relationship of the Court
to federal administrative agencies. The National Labor Relations Board
had issued an order demanding the reinstatement of certain employees
found to have been discharged in violation of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. The majority of the Court reversed the order, finding the evi-
dence insufficient to support it. Black dissented, pointing out that the act
provides that "findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by evi-
dence, shall be conclusive. ' ' 7s Accepting this as a real limitation on the
power of the courts to review, meaning that "courts should not-as here-
substitute their appraisal of the evidence for that of the Board," Black
stated that
the Labor Board, the Federal Trade Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and many other administrative
agencies were all created to deal with problems of regulation of ever increasing com-
plexity in the economic fields of trade, finance and industrial conflicts. Congress thus
sought to utilize procedures more expeditious and administered by more specialized
and experienced experts than courts had been able to afford. The decision here tends
to nullify this Congressional effort.7
6
In his first two years on the bench, Black wrote only one majority
opinion dealing with administrative law.77 Of eleven such cases before
the Court in the 1939 term, however, Black wrote the opinion of the Court
in five.78 In these opinions, and particularly in NLRB v. Waterman Steam-
ship Corp. 9 and NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, ° he elaborated his
NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 3o6 U.S. 240 (i939); and NLRB v. Sands Mfg.
Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939). Cf. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940), and
American Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 629 (i94o), involving partial modification of board
orders. Black also dissented in these cases, along with Justice Douglas.
71 Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. i, 22 (1938).
72 Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 244 (1938); NLRB v. Fansteel Metal-
lurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 265 (1939).
'3 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 346 (1939).
'4 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939)-
75 Ibid., at 3o1. 761bid.
77 FTC v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112 (1937).
78 Helvering v. Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252 (i939); NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453 (1940);
NLRB v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 309 U.S. 2o6 (1940); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n,
310 U.S. 318 (i94o); United States v. Chicago Heights Trucking Co., 310 U.S. 344 (1940).
79 309 U.S. 2o6 (294o). 8o 310 U.S. 318 (I94O).
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position that administrative findings of fact supported by evidence which
permits, at most, conflicting inferences are conclusive upon review by
the courts.8 ' He insisted that: "The proper working of the scheme fash-
ioned by Congress to determine industrial controversies fairly and peace-
ably demands that the courts quite as much as the administrative body
act as Congress has required. 1s2
As to the role of the federal courts with regard to national legislative
activity Black has had little occasion to deviate from the views of the
majority, since in every one of the twenty-eight cases in this three-year
period involving the validity of a federal statute the law was sustained. 3
He has not directly expressed his individual views on such questions as
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the federal taxing power,
or the delegation of legislative powers to the executive. On this last point,
however, there is some evidence that he may be prepared to announce
views somewhat different from those of the majority. In all cases in which
the charge of unconstitutional delegation was made, the Court deemed
it ill-founded and Black agreed. It is perhaps significant, however, that
in Shields v. Utah Idaho Central R. Co.84 Black concurred in the result
only, without expressing his reasons, but presumably reserving acceptance
of the views advanced by the majority opinion in support of that result.
In view of his use of this technique in preparing the way for his remarks
on intergovernmental tax immunity and on state public utility regulation,
one might expect to hear, as soon as the occasion calls for it, an exposition
of the views of Justice Black on the doctrine of the separation and non-
delegation of legislative powers.5
Although Black has not, in litigation directly involving acts of Con-
81 Cf. Helvering v. Lazarus, 308 U.S. 252, 255 (1939); NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453,
461 (194o).
82 NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 31o U.S. 318, 343 (1940).
83 There is not space here to list all of the cases involving the validity of- a federal statute.
Suffice it to say that Black was with the majority in all of them, and himself wrote the opinion
of the Court in the following cases: McNair v. Knott, 302 U.S. 369 (1937); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247 (1939); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (194o); Perkins v.
Lukens, 31o U.S. 113 (194o); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (i94o).
84 305 U.S. 177 (1938).
8s Black's use of this device in the tax immunity cases is discussed supra, pp. 29-31. In
the public utility cases, the dissent in McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co. and the concurring
opinion in United Gas. Co. v. Texas were preceded by a concurrence without opinion in Rail-
road Com'n v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co., 302 U.S. 388 (1937). See supra, pp. 134-35. For other
separate concurrences see Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1937); Duke Power Co.
v. Greenwood County, 302 U.S. 485 (1937); Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59 (1938); United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U.S.
331 (1939); Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
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gress, set forth his views as to the relationship between federal courts and
Congress, he has, in a somewhat different situation, clearly indicated that
his position on this question is much the same as the position more clearly
expressed in other types of litigation. In Coleman v. Miller 6 the question
before the Court was whether previous rejection by the Kansas legislature
of the Child Labor Amendment to the Federal Constitution precluded
subsequent ratification, and whether an unreasonable time had elapsed
since the submission of the amendment to the states for ratification.
Mandamus proceedings had been brought by members of the Kansas
legislature to compel a "proper record" of legislative action on the amend-
ment. The Court, speaking through the Chief Justice, ruled this a "po-
litical" question, stating that the decision of Congress on whether the
amendment was properly ratified would be made at the time of promulga-
tion and would not be reviewable by the courts. The majority opinion
failed, however, expressly to overrule Dillon v. Gloss,87 which held that
ratification must be within a reasonable time. Protesting this implication
that the judiciary might still exercise some control over the amending
process and urging that it was entirely up to Congress to determine
whether the amendment had been properly passed, Black wrote a con-
curring opinion in which he urged that the Constitution give no justifica-
tion for any review whatever, that the matter was entirely a political one,
and that
any judicial expression amounting to more than mere acknowledgement of exclusive
Congressional power over the political process of amendment is a mere admonition to
Congress in the nature of an advisory opinion, given wholly without constitutional
authority. 88
"JtfUDICIAL TEMPERAMENT"
One of the arguments most frequently used in opposing the confirma-
tion of Hugo Black as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court was that
he was lacking in "judicial temperament."8 9 The term was not carefully
defined, but it was commonly said that while Black might be a statesman,
a capable legislator, and an able politician, his temperament and personal
86 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 87 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
88 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456 (z939). See also Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474
(1939), in which it was sought to restrain Governor Chandler from sending in a certificate of
ratification of the Child Labor Amendment by the Kentucky legislature, on the ground that
the ratification was void because Kentucky had previously rejected the amendment. The
Chief Justice ruled that this was "no longer a controversy susceptible to judicial determina-
tion." Black concurred separately, on his reasoning in Coleman v. Miller.
89 81 Cong. Rec. 9071, 9087, 9097 (1937). Senator Burke in the course of the debate called
into doubt Black's "attributes of fairness, tolerance and impartiality along with judicial poise
and temperament" necessary for a Justice of the Supreme Court. 81 Cong. Rec. 9071 (1937).
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qualities fitted him to be an advocate rather than a judge. The implica-
tion was that on the bench he would be unable to throw off his partisan-
ship touching the issues with which he had dealt as a legislator. (Those
who supported the nomination were quick to remind the country that
this criticism had been made of Louis D. Brandeis at the time of his
appointment.90) Without attempting to define the term "judicial tem-
perament"; 9' without determining whether such "judicial temperament"
constitutes a sine qua non for a member of a court passing on broad issues
of public policy; and without laboring the point that many of our greatest
judges from Marshall through Brandeis were considered lacking in this
quality by many contemporaries, it is proposed here to explore further
Black's attitude toward the work of the Court and to consider whether
that attitude has changed during his three years on the bench.
Black's early opinions served, in the minds of many, to substantiate
the charge. With each dissenting or concurring opinion, it became in-
creasingly clear that those same views which had been expressed by Sen-
ator Black as to the proper Constitutional function of the judiciary were
still entertained by Justice Black on the Court. Sometimes these views
were expressed in forthright attacks upon longstanding "principles": the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment empowering courts to ex-
tend the same protection to corporations as to "persons"; the judicially-
enforceable immunity against state taxation of interstate commerce; the
implied immunity against intergovernmental taxation. Sometimes the
views took the form of objections to time-consuming procedural devices:
the returning of McCart v. Indiananapolis Water Co.9 2 for consideration
"anew" after six years of litigation; the returning of Polk v. Glover93 to
the district court when the record and common knowledge of the judges
90 See Lief, Brandeis 348-49, 377 (1936). Note also Senator Ashurst's remarks on the
parallel between this type of opposition both to Justice Brandeis and to Black. 81 Cong. Rec.
9099, 9100 (1937).
9' Consider, however, the remarks of Circuit Judge Sanborn in United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 58 Fed. 58, 69 (C.C.A. 8th 1893): "In considering [public policy], we
[judges] are not to be governed by our own views of the interests of the people, or by general
considerations tending to show what policy would probably be wise or unwise. Such a stand-
ard of determination might be unconsciously varied by the personal views of the judges who
constitute the court. The public policy of the nation must be determined by its constitution,
laws, and judicial decisions. So far as they disclose it, it is our province to learn and enforce
it; beyond that it is unnecessary and unwise to pursue our inquiries."
92 302 U.S. 419 (1937). Black's attitude in this case may be compared with his views ex-
pressed in State Tax Com'n v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 5zi (1939). In that case Black, writing for
the majority, found a federal question to support Supreme Court review of the state court's
decision, although it appeared that the state court had relied on a "non-federal" ground. The
point is discussed in 39 Col. L. Rev. io43 (1939).
9' 305 U.S. 5 (1938).
MR. JUSTICE BLACK
left little doubt as to the constitutionality of the statute. Sometimes
Black's dissents arose from a belief that underlying economic factors were
not adequately reflected in the opinions of the majority. In a case94
where a bank president and a surety company's agent were fraudulent
in issuing "window-dressing" bonds, the surety company was allowed
by the majority to raise the defense of fraud against the receiver of the
bank, just as it could have against the bank itself. For Black, the banking
corporation was not simply a unit; it was made up of an aggregate of
interests, in which the creditors represented by the receiver could not
be said to be bound by the president's fraud in the same manner as the
bank itself would have been9 5 Again, dissenting in two patent cases,
Black took occasion to express the view that since patents are aids to the
development of monopoly, courts should construe the patent statutes
strictly. In one of the cases,96 the majority decision allowed a temporary
application, made seven years before, to stand as the basis for granting
the patent, thereby increasing the total number of years during which the
applicant could control the manufacture of the article. In the other case 97
the majority upheld a licensing arrangement which greatly increased the
patentee's control over the sale of a product. Black, dissenting in both
cases, urged that the majority's departure from what he considered a
strict construction of the statutes was an unwarranted judicial aid to
monopoly.95
That a Supreme Court justice should have definite views as to the
meaning of the Constitution and the function of the judiciary thereunder
can hardly in itself be termed a lack of "judicial temperament." Since
Justice Black's view as to the degree of judicial restraint required by the
Constitution differed from the view manifested in the decisions of the
Court in the last fifty years, however, the expression of that view neces-
sarily gave the appearance of a lack of respect for precedent. True, prece-
dents were cited by Black, but they were often precedents of fifty or
more years before, doctrines which the majority felt had been superseded;
or they were a "rival" line of precedents. Whether this insistence upon a
different interpretation of the Constitution, and the incidental disregard
94 Deitrick v. Standard Surety Co., 303 U.S. 471 (1938).
95 Ibid., at 481. Cf. s Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 296 (1938), noting Deitrick v. Standard Surety Co.,
go F. (2d) 862 (C.C.A. Ist 1937).
96 Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Ferdinand Gutmann Co., 3o4 U.S. i5g (z938).
97 General Talking Picture Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938). Cf. Black's
dissenting opinion in a similar copyright case. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 3o6
U.S. 30, 42 (1939).
98 Cf. i Lyon, Watkins, Abramson, Government and Economic Life, 132-34 (1939) (r6sum6
of TNEC hearing data on "patent pendency").
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of precedents, constitutes a lack of judicial temperament depends in the
last analysis upon one's view as to whether the Constitution may be re-
interpreted, and, if so, whether the Court should effect a change by a
single decision or by a gradual process. The tenor of Black's opinions indi-
cates that he would make the change immediately, but in evaluating his
position it should be kept in mind that his views are not expressed in
majority opinions. The expression of the views in dissenting opinions did
not affect the result of the particular case, and it may be doubted whether
Black would have effected such a sweeping change if he had been writing
a majority decision. Dissenting opinions have a special role in our judi-
cial history; they sometimes express an unpopular, but realistic, view of a
case; 99 they may point to economic realities;-o they may serve as a warn-
ing or guide to the future.101 Furthermore, criticism of Black's position,
even from the standpoint that there should be no reinterpretation of the
Constitution, must be made in the light of the fact that Black came to the
bench at a time when the function of the Supreme Court had just been
called seriously into question; when the majority itself had altered its
position on some questions.' °0
Nevertheless, Black's attitude on the Court has served, for some, to
bear out the charges made at the time of his appointment with regard to
his temperamental fitness for the bench. Such criticisms, however, have
been heard less frequently in the last year. With the changing tendencies
and personnel of the tribunal, Black is no longer so spectacularly playing
a lone hand. This fact should not be interpreted as indicating any great
alteration of his own views. The new members of the Court-particularly
Justices Frankfurter and Douglas-have brought new ideas to the
group's deliberations; there has been interaction; and the result has been
that the majority of his associates now share with Black, or, from another
view point, Black shares with his associates, a new attitude. Under these
circumstances the Supreme Court itself has tended to replace Mr. Justice
Black as the chief object of -criticism based on the disregard of alleged
constitutional fundamentals.103
99 E.g., the dissent of Justice Holmes in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 104, 44 N.E.
1077, 1079 (1896).
100 E.g., the dissent of Justice Brandeis in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,3o6
(1932).
101 E.g., the concurring opinion of Black in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 424 (1938).
See pp. 29-30 supra.
-o Viz., NTLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (I937); Steward Machine Co.
v. Davis, 3o U.S. 548 (1937).
03 Albertsworth, Current Constitutional Fashions, 34 Ill. L. Rev. 5i9 (194o).
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CONCLUSION
There is probably small likelihood that the Court will adopt Black's
views concerning the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment, or
act upon his suggestion that state public utility commissions and state
courts may regulate intrastate utilities without supervision by the federal
judiciary, or withdraw from bestowing a close scrutiny upon state police
power legislation under the substantive aspect of the due process clause.
Perhaps there is little more likelihood that his views with regard to non-
discriminatory state taxation as a "burden" on interstate commerce will
find acceptance by the Court. But there is some reason to believe that
his general approach to legislative and administrative activity, his in-
sistence that the judiciary leave the choice of means to policy-making
agencies, and his distaste for the exercise of a wide judicial veto over other
branches of the government, may come to be reflected more and more in
the attitude of the majority.
If it is true, as many believe, that democracy to survive must find a
means of coping effectively with the issues of present-day civilization, it
is likewise true that legislative and administrative agencies responsible
to the people must be endowed with a sufficient breadth of action to
achieve those ends. The choice of means, within a broad periphery, must
lie with those agencies. The degree of freedom to be permitted depends,
of course, less on the Constitution itself than on the views of the various
judges as to what the Constitution requires or permits. Far more impor-
tant than particular cases decided individually is the sum of those cases
constituting the approach of the judge and the Court to legislative and
administrative action in general. It is in this realm of judicial attitude
that Mr. justice Black's constitutional opinions are playing and will con-
tinue to play their most significant role.
